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Abstract—In this paper, we present a resource allocation
mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a
finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the
presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how
misinformation affects the users of the social media platforms.
Our proposed mechanism incentivizes social media platforms
to filter misleading information efficiently, and thus indirectly
prevent the phenomenon of fake news. In particular, we design
an economically inspired mechanism that strongly implements
all generalized Nash equilibria for efficient filtering of misleading
information in the induced game. We show that our mechanism
is individually rational, budget balanced, and has at least one
equilibrium. Finally, we show that for quasi-concave utilities and
constraints, our mechanism has a generalized Nash equilibrium
and implements a Pareto efficient solution.
Index Terms—Social media, fake news, mechanism design,
Nash-implementation
I. INTRODUCTION
For the last few years, political commentators have high-
lighted that we live in a post-truth era [1], wherein the
deluge of information available on the internet has made it
extremely difficult to identify facts. Consequently, this has
led to a tendency among individuals to form their opinions
based on the believability of presented information rather than
its truthfulness [2]. A post-truth era is intertwined with the
rise of social media platforms, which act as a source of an
increasing amount of information received by individuals on
a given day. The beliefs of users are very sensitive towards
the content they are exposed to [3], which combined with the
social media attempts to maximize user engagement, can lead
to a propagation of conspiratorial thinking across the users [4].
The receptivity of social media platforms towards conspir-
atorial ideas makes them an ideal terrain to conduct political
misinformation campaigns [5]. Democratic institutions are es-
pecially vulnerable to disruption through opinion manipulation
and misinformation campaigns. Stable democracies rely on
common knowledge about the political actors and the processes
they can use to gain public support [6]. In contrast, citizens
of democracies often have a contested knowledge regarding
who should hold power and how they should wield the power
[6]. The recent introduction of alternative facts can reduce
the amount of common knowledge regarding the democracy
if it becomes an accepted belief among the citizens. Such
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disruptions can be found in the 2016 U.S. elections [7] and
Brexit Campaign in 2016 [7], where misinformation resulted
in a large number of citizens mistrusting the results of voting.
To tackle this ever-emergent phenomenon of misinformation
in democratic societies, we consider a finite group of social
media platforms, each with a finite number of users (citizens
in a democracy), and a democratic government. Every post
in the platform is associated with a parameter that captures
the level of misinformation that contains. We consider those
posts that exhibit misinformation lead to a decrease in trust in
common knowledge among the users. We assume that social
media platforms do have the technology to filter, or label, posts
that intend to sacrifice trust in common knowledge.
Motivated by capitalistic values, we can model social media
platforms to act as strategic players seeking to maximize
only their own user engagement. By imposing filters on their
platforms, however, they might lose the interest of some users,
leading to a decrease in the social media’s utility [8]. In
this modeling framework, we consider that the government
focuses on incentivizing the social media to filter misinfor-
mation on their platforms. We propose an investment made
by the government and a resource allocation mechanism to
provide appropriate incentives leading to efficient filtering
of misleading information. In this context, we formulate the
problem of incentivizing filtering of misinformation in social
media platforms as a resource allocation problem and we use
the theory of mechanism design to address it.
The theory of mechanism design was developed for the
implementation of system-wide optimal solutions to prob-
lems involving multiple rational players, each with private
information about preferences and with conflicting interests
[9]. It can be viewed as the art of designing the rules
of an induced game to achieve a specific desired outcome.
Mechanism design has broad applications spanning different
fields including economics, politics, wireless networks, social
networks, internet advertising, spectrum and bandwidth trad-
ing, logistics, supply chain, management, grid computing, and
resource allocation problems in decentralized systems. The
latter has been investigated extensively by control theorists
in the context of mechanism design, e.g., see [10]–[14] and
the references therein.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. We present
an indirect mechanism to incentivize social media platforms
to filter misleading information. We show that our proposed
mechanism is (1) feasible both at the equilibrium and off the
equilibrium, (2) budget balanced at the equilibrium, (3) indi-
vidual rational, and (4) strongly implemented at the equilibria
of the induced game. We prove the existence of at least one
generalized Nash equilibrium and show that our mechanism
induces a Pareto efficient equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the problem formulation. In Section III, we present
our mechanism. In Section IV, we prove the properties of
our mechanism. Finally, in Section V, we present concluding
remarks and some directions for future research.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a democratic society consisting of a finite set
I = {1, . . . , I}, I ∈ N, of social media platforms and a
government. For a post in social media platform i ∈ I, the
level of misinformation is denoted by xi ∈ [0, 1], where xi = 0
indicates that the post contains complete misinformation and
xi = 1 indicates that the post contains completely factual
information. Our main hypothesis states that the emergence
of a post with a misinformation level xi → 0 can lead to a
significant decrease in trust of the common knowledge in the
society among the users [6]. Each social media platform i ∈ I
has the technological means to detect and filter misinformation
by selecting an action corresponding to a filter ai that takes
values in the set A = [0, 1]. Intuitively, this filtering of
misinformation can be implemented in many ways. The social
media platform can place warnings, or labels, on posts where
xi < ai, or it can limit the propagation of such posts among its
users. The filter ai can be considered as the misinformation
threshold that is implemented by the social media platform
i ∈ I.
Motivated by [15], we consider the valuation, vi, defined
formally next, of each social media platform i ∈ I to be
the revenue generated from the engagement of its users. User
engagement in a social media platform i ∈ I is a measure of
how much users interact with posts in i. It has been shown
[4], [8] that the user engagement of a social media platform
is inversely related to the strength of misinformation filtering.
In our modeling framework, we consider that filters imple-
mented by other social media platforms may potentially affect
the engagement of a platform i ∈ I. This can occur since
users might migrate from a social media platform with high
filtering to a platform with a lower filtering.
Definition 1. For each platform i ∈ I, we define the non-
empty set Ci ⊂ I of competing platforms whose choice of
filters has an impact on the engagement of platform i.
Note that i ∈ Ci. To simplify the notation, consider that for
any two platforms i, k ∈ I, if i ∈ Ck then k ∈ Ci. However, our
mechanism can easily be extended to the case of asymmetric
competition among social media.
Assumption 1. For each platform i ∈ I, the cardinality of
the set of competing platforms |Ci| ≥ 3.
We impose Assumption 1 to simplify the presentation of the
mechanism in this short paper. It indicates a lack of monopoly
of users in any social media platform. It is reasonable to
assume that |Ci| ≥ 3, because it has been established that
the average user subscribes to 8 social media platforms [16],
leading to a lot of competition among the platforms for a user’s
attention. We also present an extension of our mechanism to
the case where |Ci| ≥ 2 in the appendix of our online preprint
[17].
Next, we define the valuation of the platform i.
Definition 2. The valuation function vi of social media
platform i ∈ I is defined as vi
(
ak : k ∈ Ci
)
: A|Ci| → R≥0.
We consider that a social media platform i ∈ I is in the
position to estimate the engagement of its users after the
implementation of filter ai through the valuation vi.
Assumption 2. The valuation vi of a social media platform
i ∈ I is a concave and differentiable function. Furthermore,
the valuation vi is decreasing with respect to the filter ai, while
it is strictly increasing with the filter al for all l ∈ C−i, where
C−i = Ci \ {i}.
Concavity of valuation functions is a standard assumption
in the literature on mechanism design [10]–[14]. By imposing
this assumption, we seek to capture the diminishing marginal
losses to engagement because of filtering by the platform i.
In contrast, it also captures the diminishing marginal utility
obtained through the filters of other competing platforms
in C−i. We present an analysis of the problem by relaxing
Assumption 2 in Section IV-A.
Our original hypothesis states that a reduction of misin-
formation on a platform leads to an increase in common
knowledge about democracy among its users [18]–[20]. Thus,
next we define the average trust in common knowledge for
every platform i, after it implements the filter ai.
Definition 3. The average trust in common knowledge across
the users of platform i ∈ I is defined by the function hi(ai) :
A → [0, 1], where ∂hi
∂ai
> 0.
The average trust hi(ai) can be considered as the estimate
of social media platform i about the average trust in common
knowledge expressed by its users after it filters misinforma-
tion. A low value of average trust, i.e., hi(ai)→ 0, implies that
the filter ai leads to low trust in common knowledge among
the users of platform i, and vice verse. In practice, a platform
i ∈ I can measure (through surveys) the opinions expressed
by its users [21], and over time, use these measurements to
estimate the impact of filter ai using the average trust function
hi. In this paper, we consider that this estimate of the platform
is accurate and represents the actual average trust among the
users post filtering.
Assumption 3. The average trust function hi is concave,
differentiable, and increasing with respect to filter ai.
We assume the function hi to be concave in order to
represent the diminishing marginal utility of filtering of mis-
information on trust in common knowledge. Concavity also
accounts for the fact that dictatorial censorship of large
amounts of information (very high filter ai) would not lead to
a proportionate increase in trust in common knowledge. We
consider that the average trust hi increases with the filter ai
to be consistent with our hypothesis that additional filtering
of misinformation leads to an increase in average trust. We
present an analysis of the problem by relaxing Assumption 3
in Section IV-A.
In addition to the social media platforms in the set I, we
also consider that the government acts as a strategic player,
who aims to ensure that users do not lose trust in common
knowledge regarding the democracy. We denote the set of all
strategic players, including the government, by J = I ∪ {0},
where 0 is the index corresponding to the government. The
action of the government is denoted by the scalar a0 that takes
values in the set A0 = [0, 1]. The action a0 represents a lower
bound threshold for the aggregate average trust of all social
media platforms in I, and is called the lower-bound filter.
Let the total users of platform i ∈ I be given by Ni ∈ N.
Then, the fraction of users of platform i in comparison to the
total users of all platforms is
ni =
Ni∑
l∈I Nl
. (1)
The fraction ni represents the contribution of the average trust
of social media platform i towards the aggregate average trust
across the democratic society. Once the government decides
on a lower bound a0, every platform that participates in the
mechanism must ensure that the following constraint is not
violated:
a0 −
∑
i∈I
ni · hi(ai) ≤ 0. (2)
Since
∑
i∈I ni = 1, the term ni · hi represents the fractional
contribution of the social media platform i to the trust of the
entire system after filtering.
In a similar way, the government’s valuation is denoted by
the function v0(a0) : [0, 1] → R≥0, which is known only
to the government. Furthermore, the government has limited
resources available to invest in the problem, i.e., there exists
a finite monetary budget b0 ∈ R≥0 that the government is
willing to spend.
Assumption 4. The valuation of the government v0 is a
concave, differentiable, and strictly increasing with respect to
the lower-bound filter a0.
Assumption 4 is reasonable since government’s valuation
increases as the average trust on common knowledge increases.
The concavity of v0 captures that fact that as a0 increases,
the government’s valuation reaches its highest potential real-
ization. We present an analysis of the problem by relaxing
Assumption 4 in Section IV-A.
A. Problem Statement
The government seeks to incentivize the social media
platforms to implement filters. However, in order to design
a fair mechanism, we consider that the government hires
a social planner, e.g., a mediator, who seeks to design a
mechanism between all social media and the government,
that can maximize the social welfare (sum of utilities) of all
players. This is a formidable problem as the social media and
the government, in the presence of asymmetric information,
may fail to select the actions that will lead to a socially
optimal solution/equilibrium. Thus, the social planner needs
to design, for each social media platform i ∈ I, appropriate
taxes ti ∈ R, which can be either monetary payments, or
subsidies, and an appropriate investment t0 ∈ R≥0 for the
government to induce a game at the equilibrium of which we
have the desired outcome. In our formulation, the government
may never collect a monetary subsidy from any social media
platform. The utility of each platform i ∈ I is ui = vi − ti,
and the utility of the government is u0 = v0 − t0.
Ideally, the social planner must design a mechanism which
will redistribute all payments between the social media plat-
forms and the government, which implies that the mecha-
nism should be budget balanced, i.e.,
∑
i∈J ti = 0. Let
the action profile and the payment profile be denoted by
a = (a0, a1 . . . , aI) and t = (t0, t1, . . . , tI), respectively.
Problem 1. The centralized optimization problem for the
social planner to solve is
max
a,t
(
v0 − t0 +
∑
i∈I
(vi − ti)
)
, (3)
subject to: 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ J , (4)
a0 −
∑
i∈I
ni · hi(ai) ≤ 0, (5)
0 ≤ t0 ≤ b0, (6)∑
i∈J
ti = 0, (7)
where (4) gives the bounds of the filter of each social media
platform i ∈ I, (5) provides a low bound for the aggregate
average opinion of all users, and (6) provides the bounds of
the government investment.
We impose the following informational assumptions on
Problem 1.
Assumption 5. The function hi for each social media platform
i ∈ I, is not known to the government and social planner.
However, the output of the function hi(ai) can be monitored
by any competing platform l ∈ C−i, and a violation of
constraint (5) can be monitored by the government.
In order to enforce the mechanism in a static environment,
we assume that the output of the average trust hi(ai) can
be monitored by any competing platform l ∈ C−i. In the
proposed mechanism in Section III, the social planner asks
each platform i ∈ I to commit to a lower bound of average
trust that it will achieve through filtering. Then, if the filter
selected by the platform i leads to an average trust hi(ai)
less than the commitment, another competing social media
platform l ∈ C−i can choose to report this discrepancy to the
social planner. The platform l has an incentive to report the
discrepancy because its valuation vl increases with the filter
ai. Furthermore, the government may impose a large tax on
all social media when the constraint (5) is violated, unless
the culprit is revealed. We believe that this assumption can
be relaxed using dynamic mechanism design in a potential
direction of future research.
Assumption 6. The valuation vi of each social media platform
i ∈ I is the private information of i. Similarly, the valuation v0
and the budget b0 of the government are private information of
the government. Meanwhile, the sets Ci and fraction of users
ni of the platform i are known to all players in J .
Note that the government has no incentive to lie about its
budget b0 or valuation v0 to the social planner. Furthermore,
neither the social planner nor the government know the
valuations and average trust functions of the social media
platforms. Thus, the social planner and the government have
the same information structure, and can be considered as the
same physical entity. However, we give them two labels to
differentiate between their roles as an investor (government)
and as a designer of the mechanism (social planner). In
absence of the information constraints of Assumptions 5 and
6, the social planner would have complete information of the
valuations vi and the average trust hi of each social media
platform i ∈ I, and the valuation v0 of the government. This
would enable the social planner to solve Problem 1 using
standard optimization methods and allocate the optimal actions
to each social media. Nonetheless, the objective function in
Problem 1 is differentiable, concave, and the set of feasible
filters is non-empty, convex, and compact. Hence, Problem 1
has a unique solution, denoted by a∗ = (a∗0, a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
I), and
referred to as the efficient outcome.
III. MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH
We propose a two-step mechanism to incentivize the fil-
tering of misinformation among the social media platforms.
As a first step, every platform i ∈ I decides whether to
participate in the mechanism (with complete knowledge of
the second step of the proposed mechanism, described later).
Consider a platform i ∈ I that chooses not to participate in the
mechanism. Then, it pays no tax and receives no subsidy from
the government, i.e., ti = 0. Furthermore, platform i is free to
select the lowest filter ai = 0 in order to maximize its valua-
tion vi. Meanwhile, another competing platform l ∈ C−i may
still decide to participate in the mechanism and subsequently
implement a non-zero filter al. In this situation, certain users
may migrate from the platform l onto platform i and increase
the valuation vi of user i, as noted in Section II. In order
to avoid this problem, we make an additional assumption that
the government can exclude a non-participating platform i ∈ I
from receiving an increase in engagement due to the filter al
implemented by a participating platform l ∈ C−i.
Assumption 7. For any social media platform i ∈ I that
decides to not participate in the mechanism, the government
can ensure that it receives no benefits from the filters of
participating social media, i.e., its valuation is given by
vi(ak = 0 : k ∈ Ci).
In the literature on static mechanisms, the ability to exclude
a player from receiving benefits (typically, benefits of some
common resource) is necessary for voluntary participation
along with no monetary investment [22], and is often assumed
implicitly [10]–[13]. In our mechanism, the government is
willing to make an investment up to its budget b0. Thus, we
assume partial excludability of the engagement in Assumption
7, where a non-participating platform i can select its own filter
freely (with the dominant action as ai = 0), but cannot receive
benefits from the filters of other platforms. We believe that this
assumption may also be relaxed using a dynamic mechanism,
as in [23].
In practice, the government and participating social media
platforms can publicize the fact that platform i has chosen not
to contribute towards filtering misinformation. The resulting
loss in credibility among users of participating platforms
should disincentivize them from migrating to platform i. We
will establish in Theorem 4 that Assumption 7 indeed leads
to voluntary participation of platforms and the government
in the mechanism. In the future, we would like to formally
expand upon how the government may achieve this property
by considering a more detailed model of user behavior.
The second step of the mechanism is presented considering
that all social media platforms and the government choose to
participate in the mechanism. We denote the second step of
the mechanism by the tuple 〈M, g(·)〉, where M = M0 ×
M1 × · · · × MI , I = |I|, is the complete message space
of all social media and the government, and g(·) : M →
O is the outcome function that maps each message profile
to a set of outcomes O. The message of each social media
platform i ∈ I is denoted by mi ∈Mi, and the government’s
message is denoted bym0 ∈M0. The set of outcomes is in the
form {(a0, a1, . . . , aI), (t0, t1, . . . , tI) | ai ∈ A, ti ∈ R, i ∈
J }. The outcome function g(m) determines the outcome of
any given message profile m = (m0,m1, . . . ,mI) ∈M. The
payment function for the social media platform i is defined as
ti : M→ R and determines the monetary payment made or
received by the social media platform i.
For each i ∈ I, let Di = Ci ∪ {0}, and D−i = Di \ {i}.
Explicitly, the message of platform i is defined as follows:
mi = (c˜i, p˜ii, a˜i), (8)
where c˜i ∈ R≥0 is the minimum average trust that platform
i proposes to achieve through filtering; p˜ii ∈ R
|D−i|
≥0 , is the
collection of prices that platform i is willing to pay (or receive)
per unit change in the filters of other competing platforms and
the government, given by
p˜ii = (p˜i
i
l : l ∈ D−i), (9)
and a˜i = (a˜
i
k : k ∈ Di), a˜i ∈ R
|Di|, is the profile of filters
proposed by the platform i for all competing platforms and
the government. Note that in (9), platform i does not propose
a price for its own filter.
The message of the government is m0 = (p˜i0, a˜
0
0), where
p˜i0 ∈ R≥0 is the price the government is willing to pay (or
receive) per unit change in average trust, and a˜00 ∈ R is the
filter proposed by the government. Note that our proposed
mechanism respects the privacy of all social media platforms
by not requesting them to reveal the entire functional forms
of their private information.
Based on the messages she receives, the social planner
allocates filters to each platform i ∈ I and a low-bound
filter for the government, such that the constraints in Problem
1 are satisfied. The filter allocated by the social planner to
the platform i is the average of the filters proposed by all
competing platforms including i, i.e., fi(m) =
∑
k∈Ci
a˜k
i
|Ci|
.
The low bound filter allocated by the social planner to the
government is the average of the filters proposed by all
platforms and the government, i.e., f0(m) =
∑
k∈J
a˜k
0
|J | . The
social planner also allocates to each platform i ∈ I the
minimum average trust βi(m) ∈ [0, 1] that they must achieve
to ensure that constraint (5) of Problem 1 is not violated,
βi(m) = min
{
ni · c˜i∑
k∈I nk · c˜k
· f0(m), 1
}
. (10)
The social media platform i ∈ I needs to ensure that the
message mi does not lead to a situation where
∑
k∈I nk ·
c˜k = 0. The platform i needs to select a filter ai such that
ni · hi(ai) ≥ βi(m). A potential violation of this condition
cannot be detected by the social planner since she does not
have explicit knowledge of hi(·) (Assumption 5). However,
the output of hi(·) can be monitored by any other competing
platform l ∈ C−i (Assumption 5). Note that the utility ul of
the competing platform l is a function of the allocated filter
fi(m). Thus, any violation of ni · hi(ai) ≥ βi(m) will be
reported by platform l to the social planner, in order to ensure
that the allocation fi(m) maximizes the utility ul. The social
planner may then tax heavily any violation of the lower bound
on average trust.
The social planner also allocates a price τ il =∑
k∈C−l:k 6=i
p˜ik
l
|Cl|−2
, τ il ∈ R≥0, to every i ∈ I corresponding
to the filter fl(m) of any other competing platform k ∈ C−l
except i. This price is simply the average of prices proposed
for the filter fl(m) by all competing platforms in C−l except
i. This ensures that the allocated price τ il for i per unit change
in the filter fl(m) is independent of the prices proposed by
both i and l. Then, the social planner proposes the following
payment function for each social media platform i ∈ I:
ti = −p˜i0 · βi(m)−
∑
l∈C−i
τ li · fi(m) +
∑
l∈C−i
τ il · fl(m)
+
∑
l∈C−i∪{0}
p˜iil · (a˜
i
l − a˜
−i
l )
2, (11)
where a˜−il =
∑
k∈C−l
a˜k
l
|Cl|−1
, for each l ∈ C−i, is the average
of the proposed filters of everybody except i ∈ I. The payment
function (11) can be described as follows: (i) the first term in
(11) represents a subsidy given by the government for the
increase in average trust among the users of social media
platform i; (ii) the second term in (11) is a subsidy given
by the competing platform l ∈ C−i for the benefit it receives
due to the allocated filter fi; (iii) the third term in (11) is a
payment for the benefit received by platform i because of the
filters imposed by the competing platform l ∈ C−i; and (iv)
the fourth term in (11) is a collection of penalties to social
media platform i for violating the truthfulness in its message
(8) with regards to the filters proposed for competing platforms
in l ∈ C−i and the government. Note that the fourth term also
ensures that the social media platform i has an incentive to
propose lower prices p˜iil corresponding to the actions of other
players l ∈ C−i ∪ {0}. Note that having competing platforms
l ∈ C−i pay a tax for their benefit from the filter ai, serves to
further incentivize the platform i to filter misinformation.
The social planner also proposes the following payment
function to the government:
t0 = pi−0 · f0(m) + (p˜i0 − pi−0)
2, (12)
where pi−0 =
∑
i∈I
p˜ii
0
I
. The first component in (12) represents
the total investment made by the government for the allocated
low bound filter f0(m), and the second term represents a
penalty when the government’s price proposal for its own
action is far from the average price proposed by all social
media.
A. Generalized Nash Equilibrium and the Induced Game
Formally, a mechanism 〈M, g(·)〉 together with the utility
functions (ui)i∈I induces a game in which the social planner
allocates the filters (actions) f(m) = (f0(m), . . . , fI(m)).
Each i ∈ I selects the filter ai = fi(m) while the government
selects the low bound filter a0 = f0(m). The strategy of a
each i ∈ I is given by its message mi ∈ Mi [9], with the
constraint that fi ∈ Si(m), where
Si(m) = {ai ∈ A : ni · hi(ai) ≥ βi(m)}. (13)
Thus, the set of feasible allocations Si(m) for i ∈ I is a
function of the messages of all social media in I and the
government. The strategy of the government is denoted by m0
and the set of feasible strategies is given by M0. For such a
game, we select the solution concept of the generalized Nash
equilibrium (GNE). A strategy profile m∗ = (m∗i : i ∈ J ) is
the GNE of the induced game, if for each i ∈ I,
ui(fk(m
∗
i ,m
∗
−i) : k ∈ Ci)
≥ ui(fk(mi,m
∗
−i) : k ∈ Ci), (14)
for all mi ∈ Mi and fi ∈ Si(m), and if the strategy
m∗0 of the government is such that u0(f0(m
∗
0,m
∗
−0)) ≥
u0(f0(m0,m
∗
−0)), for all m0 ∈ M0, where m−i =
(m0, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mI). Note that while the GNE so-
lution concept assumes complete information, we adopt it for
our game with private information by using the interpretation
that the social media can utilize an iterative learning process
to find a GNE in the induced game [24].
IV. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
In this section, we show that our proposed mechanism
has the following desirable properties: (i) budget balance at
GNE, (ii) feasibility at GNE, (iii) strong implementation, (iv)
existence of at least one GNE, and (v) individual rationality.
Problem 2. The optimization problem for social media plat-
form i ∈ I is
max
mi∈Mi
vi
(
fk(m) : k ∈ C−i
)
− ti(m), (15)
subject to: 0 ≤ fi(m) ≤ 1, (16)
βi(m)− ni · hi
(
fi(m)
)
≤ 0, (17)
where (16) provides the bounds of the allocated filter of social
media platform i, (17) provides the lower bound on the fraction
of average trust among users of social media platform i.
The social planner can ensure that (16) and (17) are hard
constraints by imposing a tax ti →∞ when they are violated.
Problem 3. The optimization problem for the government is
max
m0∈M0
v0
(
f0(m)
)
− t0(m), (18)
subject to: 0 ≤ f0(m) ≤ 1, (19)
pi−0 · f0(m)− b0 ≤ 0, (20)
where (19) provides the bounds of the filter (action) a0 of
the government, and (20) ensures that the total government’s
subsidy is less than its budget b0.
Next, using the solution of Problem 3, we show that our
mechanism ensures that the government’s proposed price at
GNE is equal to the average price proposed by all social media.
Lemma 1. Let the message profile m∗ be a GNE of the
induced game. Then, p˜i∗0 = pi
∗
−0 for the government.
Proof. Since the objective function in Problem 3 is concave
with respect to the price p˜i0, the price p˜i
∗
0 at GNE can be found
by ∂u0
∂p˜i0
∣∣
p˜i∗
0
= 2 · (p˜i∗0 −pi
∗
−0) = 0, which yields p˜i
∗
0 = pi
∗
−0.
Similarly, Problem 2 implies that at GNE, the filters pro-
posed by the social media are equal to each other, unless the
corresponding price proposal is 0.
Lemma 2. Let the message profile m∗ ∈ M be a GNE of
the induced game. Then, for p˜iik 6= 0, we have a˜
i∗
k = a˜
−i∗
k for
every social media platform i ∈ I, for every k ∈ D−i.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 1. Due
to space limitations hence it is omitted.
Next, we show that our proposed mechanism is budget
balanced at any GNE.
Theorem 1 (Budget Balance). Consider any GNE m∗ ∈M
of the induced game. Then, the proposed mechanism is budget
balanced, i.e.,
∑
i∈J ti(m
∗) = 0.
Proof. From Lemmas 1 and 2, the tax t∗i = ti(m
∗) for social
media platform i at GNE is t∗i = −p˜i
∗
0 · βi(m
∗)−
∑
l∈C−i
τ li ·
fi(m) +
∑
l∈C−i
τ il · fl(m). The tax t
∗
0 for the government at
GNE is t∗0 = p˜i
∗
0 ·f0(m
∗), where p˜i∗0 is the GNE price per unit
change on average trust. Since
∑
i∈I βi(m) = f0(m), for all
m ∈M, then at GNE we have
∑
i∈J
t∗i =
∑
i∈I
[
−
∑
l∈C−i
τ li ·fi(m)+
∑
l∈C−i
τ il ·fl(m)
]
= 0. (21)
Our next result establishes that at all GNE outcomes of the
induced game of our proposed mechanism are feasible.
Lemma 3 (Feasibility). Every GNE message profilem∗ ∈M
leads to a filter profile
(
f0(m
∗), f1(m
∗), . . . , fI(m
∗)
)
, which
is a feasible solution of Problem 1.
Proof. Every GNE message profile m∗ satisfies (16) - (17)
and (19) - (20). From Theorem 1,
∑
i∈J ti(m
∗) = 0. For each
i ∈ I, βi(m) ≤ ni · hi(fi(m)), and
∑
i∈I βi(m) = f0(m).
Hence,
∑
i∈I hi(fi(m)) ≥ f0(m).
The next result implies that every social media platform i
can unilaterally deviate in its message mi ∈ Mi, to achieve
any desired allocation of filter fk(m) ∈ A, for any k ∈ Ci.
Lemma 4. Given the message profile m−i ∈ M−i, the social
media platform i ∈ I can unilaterally deviate in its message
mi ∈ Mi to obtain any choice of allocated filter fk(m) ∈ A,
for all k ∈ Ci.
Proof. Let m−i =
(
m0, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mI
)
be a mes-
sage profile. Then, i can propose a filter a˜ik = fk(m) −∑
l∈Ck:l 6=i
a˜l
k
|Ck|−1
, and a filter a˜i0 for the government, given
by
a˜i0 =
|J | · hi(fi)
c˜i
·
∑
k∈I
nk · c˜k −
∑
l∈J−i
a˜l0, (22)
such that fi(m) ∈ Si(m).
Next, we show the allocations of our proposed mechanism
at GNE are equal to the optimal solution of Problem 1.
Theorem 2 (Strong Implementation). Consider any GNE
m∗ ∈ M of the induced game. Then, the filter profile(
f0(m
∗), f1(m
∗), . . . , fI(m
∗)
)
at equilibrium is equal to the
optimal solution a∗o of Problem 1.
Proof. Let f(m∗) =
(
f1(m
∗), . . . , fI(m
∗)
)
. Then, the GNE
message profile m∗ satisfies, for platform i ∈ I, the following
Kush-Kahn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality:
∂vi
∂fi
∣∣∣∣∣
f(m∗)
+
∑
l∈I−i
τ li − λ
i
i + µ
i
i + ν
i
i ·
∂hi
∂fi
∣∣∣∣∣
f(m∗)
= 0, (23)
∂vi
∂fl
∣∣∣∣∣
f(m∗)
− τ il = 0, ∀l ∈ C−i, (24)
p˜i∗0 − ν
i
i = 0, (25)
λii ·
(
fi(m
∗)− 1
)
= 0, (26)
µii · fi(m
∗) = 0, (27)
νii ·
(
βi(m
∗)− hi(fi(m
∗))
)
= 0, (28)
λii, µ
i
i, ν
i
i ≥ 0, (29)
where (23) - (25) are the derivatives of the Lagrangian of
platform i with respect to f(m) and βi(m), for Problem 2,
and (26) - (29) are constraints on the Lagrange multipliers
(λii, µ
i
i, ν
i
i). From (25), ν
i
i = p˜i
∗
0 for all i ∈ I. Substituting
(24) in (23), we have
∑
k∈Ci
∂vk
∂fi
∣∣∣∣∣
f(m∗)
− λii + µ
i
i + ν
i
i ·
∂hi
∂fi
∣∣∣∣∣
f(m∗)
= 0, (30)
for all i ∈ I. Similarly, the KKT conditions for Problem 3
are:
∂v0
∂f0
∣∣∣∣∣
f0(m∗)
− p˜i∗0 − λ
0
0 + µ
0
0 + ω
0
0 · p˜i
∗
0 = 0, (31)
λ00 ·
(
f0(m
∗)− 1
)
= 0, (32)
µ00 · f0(m
∗) = 0, (33)
ω00 ·
(
p˜i∗0 · f0(m
∗)− b0
)
= 0, (34)
λ00, µ
0
0, ω
0
0 ≥ 0, (35)
where (31) is the derivative of the Lagrangian, and (32) - (35)
are constraints on the Lagrange multipliers (λ00, µ
0
0, ω
0
0).
The optimal solution a∗o of Problem 1 satisfies the follow-
ing KKT conditions:
∑
k∈Ci
∂vk
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
a∗o
i
− λi + µi+ν ·
∂hi
∂ai
∣∣∣∣∣
a∗o
i
= 0, ∀i ∈ I, (36)
∂v0
∂a0
∣∣∣∣∣
a∗o
0
− λ0 + µ0 − ν − ω · pi−0 = 0, (37)
λi · (a
∗o
i − 1) = 0, ∀i ∈ J , (38)
µi · a
∗o
i = 0, ∀i ∈ J , (39)
ν ·
(
a∗o0 − hi(a
∗o
i )
)
= 0, (40)
ω · (pi−0 · a
∗o
0 − b0) = 0, (41)
λi, µi, ω, ν ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ J , (42)
where (36) - (37) are the derivatives of the Lagrangian,
and (38) - (39) are constraints on the Lagrange multipliers
(λi, µi, ω, ν : i ∈ J ). By setting pi−0 = p˜i
∗
0 , λi = λ
i
i, µi = µ
i
i,
ν = p˜i∗0 , ω = ω
0
0 , a
∗o
i = fi(m
∗), which implies that the
efficient allocation of filters for all social media platforms and
the government is implemented by all GNE of the induced
game.
Next, we show that our mechanism guarantees existence of
at least one GNE.
Theorem 3 (GNE existence). Let a∗o be the unique optimal
solution of Problem 1. Then, there is a GNE m∗ ∈ M
of the induced game that guarantees that the action profile(
f0(m
∗), f1(m
∗), . . . , fI(m
∗)
)
at GNE satisfies fi(m
∗) =
a∗oi , for all i ∈ Ji.
Proof. Consider that the action profile a∗o which satisfies
the KKT conditions for Problem 1 with the corresponding
Lagrange multipliers (λi, µi, ν, ω : i ∈ J ). Taking similar
steps to the proof of Theorem 2, we can show that for
p˜i0 = pi−0 = ν, the Lagrange multipliers of Problems 2 and
3 are λii = λi, µ
i
i = µi, ν
i
i = ν, ω
0
0 = ω, i ∈ J , and the
allocated prices are τ il =
∂vi
∂fl
∣∣
a∗o
, for all l ∈ C−i, while the
filters at GNE are equal to fi(m
∗) = a∗oi .
Next, we use Assumption 7 to show that our proposed
mechanism is individually rational.
Theorem 4 (Individually Rational). The proposed mecha-
nism is individually rational, i.e., each media i ∈ I and the
government prefer the outcome of every GNE of the induced
game to the outcome of not participating.
Proof. Consider any GNE message m∗. By Lemma 4, given
m∗−i, for social media platform i there exists mi ∈ Mi such
that f0(mi,m
∗
−i) = 0. Furthermore, social media platform
i can unilaterally deviate in its message mi to ensure that
for every platform k ∈ Ci, the allocated filter is given by
fk(mi,m
∗
−i) = 0. By the definition of the GNE in (14), we
have ui(m
∗) ≥ ui(mi,m
∗
−i). Consider the message mi =
(c˜i, p˜ii, a˜i) defined in (8) with p˜i
i
l = 0, for all l ∈ C−i ∪ {0},
a˜ik = −
∑
l∈C−i
a˜lk, for all k ∈ C−i, and a˜
i
0 = −
∑
l∈J−i
a˜i0.
Then, the allocation fk(mi,m
∗
−i) = 0 is feasible for every
platform k ∈ Ci and the corresponding tax for social media
platform i is given by ti = 0. The utility ui(mi,m
∗
−i) of social
media platform i is given by ui(mi,m
∗
−i) = vi(0, . . . , 0) −
0. Hence, ui(m
∗) ≥ vi(0, . . . , 0). Therefore, for any social
media platform i ∈ I participating in the mechanism, their
utility ui is at least as good as the utility compared to not
participating.
A. Extension to Quasi-Concave Valuations
We now relax Assumptions 2 - 4, and replace them with
the more general assumptions that: (1) The valuation vi
of the players in i ∈ J are quasi-concave, differentiable,
and have the same monotonic properties as before. (2) The
average trust hi of any social media platform i ∈ I is a
differentiable and increasing function of ai. We cannot use the
KKT conditions to prove the existence of a GNE and strong
implementation under these relaxed assumptions. However,
note that at any GNE (if it exists), the proposed mechanism
is still budget balanced, feasible and individually rational. In
addition, Lemmas 1, 2, and 4 also hold as they do not depend
on the concavity of the valuation.
Now we prove that for the relaxed assumption, there exists
a GNE and that it induces a Pareto efficient equilibrium in
the game. Pareto efficiency refers to the condition where
we cannot improve the utility of any player (social media
platform or the government), without decreasing the utility
of another player [9]. Pareto efficiency is a weaker property
in comparison to the strong implementation achieved by our
mechanism for concave valuations.
Theorem 5. Let the valuation function vi be quasi-concave
and differentiable for all players i ∈ J and consider the
game 〈M, g(·), (ui)i∈I〉. Then, (1) there exists a GNE for
the induced game, and (2) every GNE of the induced game is
Pareto efficient.
Proof. 1) Existence: Consider the social media platform i ∈ I.
Lemma 2 implies that at GNE, the message mi must lie in
the set M′i :=
{
mi ∈ Mi : p˜i
i
l · (a˜
i
l − a
−i
l ) = 0, ∀l ∈ D−i
}
.
For all mi ∈M
′
i, we can write the utility ui(m) as
ui(m) = vi(fk(m) : k ∈ Ci) + p˜i0 · βi(m)
+
∑
l∈C−i
τ li · fi(m)−
∑
l∈C−i
τ il · fl(m), (43)
where the prices p˜i0, τ
l
i , and τ
i
l for any l ∈ C−i are independent
of mi. Observe that ui(m) = ui(βi, fk : fk ∈ Di). Lemma
4 implies that given a message profile m−i of all platforms
and the government in J−i, the platform i can unilaterally
deviate in its message mi ∈ Mi to receive any allocation
fk(m) ∈ A, k ∈ Di. Thus, instead of the message mi, we
equivalently consider that the action of the platform i is to
select the tuple αi =
(
βi, fk : k ∈ Di
)
, that takes values
in the set Ai =
{
[0, 1] × A|Di| : ni · hi(fi) − βi ≥ 0
}
.
For the differentiable function hi(·), the set Ai is convex,
compact, and obviously, independent of the message profile
m−i. Similarly, the action of the government f0 takes values
in the set A that is compact, convex, and independent of the
message profile m−0.
Let the valuation vi for every platform i ∈ I be quasi-
concave and differentiable. Then, for every i ∈ I, the utility
ui(α) in (43) is also quasi-concave and differentiable with
respect to the action αi ∈ Ai. A similar argument implies
that the government’s utility u0(f0) is quasi concave and
differentiable with respect to its action f0. Hence, it follows
from Glicksberg’s theorem [25] that there exists an NE for the
game.
2) Pareto efficiency: It is sufficient in our case to show that
the NE can be characterized by a Walrasian equilibrium as all
Walrasian equilibria are Pareto efficient [9]. So, as in part 1,
consider an arbitrary NE action profile α∗ =
(
f∗0 , α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
I
)
that takes values in the set A×A1×· · ·AI . From the definition
of the NE, for every platform i ∈ I it holds that
ui(α
∗) ≥ ui(αi, α
∗
−i), ∀αi ∈ Ai. (44)
Note that the NE prices p˜i∗0 , τ
∗l
i , τ
∗i
l , for all l ∈ I−i cannot be
influenced by the platform i, i.e., every social media platform
is a price taker. Then, using the definition of the NE in (44)
with the utility ui in (43), we can write for platform i that
α∗i = arg max
αi∈Ai
{
vi(fk : k ∈ Ci) + p˜i
∗
0 · βi
+
∑
l∈I−i
τ∗li · fi −
∑
l∈I−i
τ∗il · fl
}
. (45)
Similarly, the government also behaves as a price taker because
it cannot influence the NE price pi∗−0. For the government at
NE, we can write that
f∗0 = arg max
f0∈A
{v0(f0)− pi
∗
−0 · f0}. (46)
It follows immediately that the NE action profile α∗ constitutes
a Walrasian equilibrium and thus, the NE for the induced game
forms a Pareto efficient equilibrium [9]. Since any NE is also
a GNE by definition then it follows immediately that every
GNE of the induced game is Pareto efficient.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied the incentivization of social media
platforms to filter users’ misleading information on their
platforms. We designed a mechanism that induces a game
with a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) with the following
desirable properties: a GNE always exists and is strongly
implementable, the optimal filter for all social media is feasible
at or off the equilibrium, participation of the social media is
voluntary, and the system has a balanced budget at any GNE.
Finally, we relax the assumption of concavity of the valuation
and average trust of all players, and show the our mechanism
still induces a Pareto efficient GNE.
In the future, we plan to analyze the presence of social
media platforms with no competition. We also plan to model
uncertainty in estimating the impact of filters on engagement
and average trust. Finally, we seek to incorporate the engage-
ment behavior and dynamics of trust evolution among the users
into our system and mechanism. We believe that these factors
can be incorporated using a dynamic mechanism, in addition
to relaxing our assumptions on excludibility of platforms and
monitoring of average trust.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we present an extension of Assumption
1 to include all platforms i ∈ I with a set of competing
platforms such that |Ci| ≥ 2.
Consider the same first step for the mechanism as before.
In the second step, the message of each social media platform
i ∈ I is denoted by mi ∈Mi, and the government’s message
is denoted by m0 ∈M0. The payment function for the social
media platform i is defined as ti : M → R and determines
the monetary payment made or received by the social media
platform i. Explicitly, the message of platform i is defined as
follows:
mi = (c˜i, p˜ii, a˜i), (47)
where c˜i ∈ R≥0 is the minimum average trust that platform
i proposes to achieve through filtering; p˜ii, is the collection
of prices that platform i is willing to pay (or receive) per
unit change in the filters of other competing platforms and the
government, given by
p˜ii =
{
(p˜iil : l ∈ Di), if |Ci| = 2,
(p˜iil : l ∈ D−i), if |Ci| ≥ 3,
(48)
where p˜iil ∈ R≥0 for all i, l ∈ J , and a˜i = (a˜
i
k : k ∈ Di), with
a˜i ∈ R
|Di| is the profile of filters proposed by the platform i
for all competing platforms and the government. The message
of the government is m0 = (p˜i0, a˜
0
0), where p˜i0 ∈ R≥0 is the
price the government is willing to pay (or receive) per unit
change in average trust, and a˜00 ∈ R is the filter proposed by
the government.
Based on the messages she receives, the social planner
allocates filters to each platform i ∈ I and a low-bound
filter for the government, such that the constraints in Problem
1 are satisfied. The filter allocated by the social planner to
the platform i is the average of the filters proposed by all
competing platforms including i, i.e., fi(m) =
∑
k∈Ci
a˜k
i
|Ci|
.
The low bound filter allocated by the social planner to the
government is the average of the filters proposed by all
platforms and the government, i.e., f0(m) =
∑
k∈J
a˜k
0
|J | . The
social planner also allocates to each platform i ∈ I the
minimum average trust βi(m) ∈ [0, 1] that they must achieve
to ensure that constraint (5) of Problem 1 is not violated,
βi(m) = min
{
ni · c˜i∑
k∈I nk · c˜k
· f0(m), 1
}
. (49)
The social media platform i ∈ I needs to ensure that the
message mi does not lead to a situation where
∑
k∈I nk ·
c˜k = 0. The platform i needs to select a filter ai such that
ni · hi(ai) ≥ βi(m). A potential violation of this condition
cannot be detected by the social planner since she does not
have explicit knowledge of hi(·) (Assumption 5). However,
the output of hi(·) can be monitored by any other competing
platform l ∈ C−i (Assumption 5). Note that the utility ul of
the competing platform l is a function of the allocated filter
fi(m). Thus, any violation of ni · hi(ai) ≥ βi(m) will be
reported by platform l to the social planner, in order to ensure
that the allocation fi(m) maximizes the utility ul. The social
planner may then tax heavily any violation of the lower bound
on average trust.
The social planner also allocates a tax price
τ il =


pill , if |Cl| = 2,∑
k∈C−l:k 6=i
p˜ikl
|Cl| − 2
, if |Cl| ≥ 3,
(50)
τ il ∈ R≥0, that any platform i ∈ I must pay for the filter
fl(m) of any other competing platform l ∈ C−i. Similarly, the
social planner allocates a subsidy price
σli =


piil , if |Cl| = 2,∑
k∈C−l:k 6=i
p˜ikl
|Cl| − 2
, if |Cl| ≥ 3,
(51)
σil ∈ R≥0, that any platform l ∈ I receives from any other
competing platform i ∈ C−l. This ensures that the price τ
i
l paid
by platform i for any filter fl(m), and the prices received σ
i
l
by platform i are both independent of the message mi. Then,
the social planner proposes the following payment function
for each social media platform i ∈ I:
ti = −p˜i0 · βi(m)−
∑
l∈C−i
σil · fi(m) +
∑
l∈C−i
τ il · fl(m)
+
∑
l∈C−i∪{0}
p˜iil · (a˜
i
l − a˜
−i
l )
2
+
∑
l∈C−i
(
I(|Ci| = 2) · (pi
i
i − pi
l
i)
2 + I(|Cl| = 2) · (pi
i
l − pi
l
l)
2
)
,
(52)
where a˜−il =
∑
k∈C−l
a˜k
l
|Cl|−1
, for each l ∈ C−i, is the average
of the proposed filters of everybody except i ∈ I, and I(·)
is the indicator function. The payment function (52) can be
described as follows: (i) the first term in (52) represents a
subsidy given by the government for the increase in average
trust among the users of social media platform i; (ii) the
second term in (52) is a subsidy given by the competing
platform l ∈ C−i for the benefit it receives due to the allocated
filter fi; (iii) the third term in (52) is a payment for the
benefit received by platform i because of the filters imposed
by the competing platform l ∈ C−i; (iv) the fourth term in
(52) is a collections of penalties to social media platform i for
violating the truthfulness in its message (8) with regards to the
filters proposed for competing platforms in l ∈ C−i and the
government; and (v) the fifth term is a collection of penalties
to social media i for violating truthfulness with regards to
price when either it has |Ci| = 2, or its competitor l ∈ C−i
has |Cl| = 2. Note that the social media i cannot affect either
the prices τ il that it pays or subsidy prices σ
i
l it receives for
all l ∈ C−i.
The social planner also proposes the following payment
function to the government:
t0 = pi−0 · f0(m) + (p˜i0 − pi−0)
2, (53)
where pi−0 =
∑
i∈I
p˜ii
0
I
. The first component in (12) represents
the total investment made by the government for the allocated
low bound filter f0(m), and the second term represents a
penalty when the government’s price proposal for its own
action is far from the average price proposed by all social
media.
Then, the following lemma holds for the extended mecha-
nism.
Lemma 5. For every social media platform i ∈ I and
competing platform l ∈ C−i, at GNE it holds that
σ∗il = τ
∗l
i , (54)
i.e., the equilibrium price received by platform i is the same
as the price paid by the platform l.
Proof. Consider two social media platforms i ∈ I and l ∈
C−i. The result holds from the definition of σ
i
l and τ
l
i when
|Ci| ≥ 3 and |Cl ≥ 3.
Now we let |Ci| = 2. Then, at GNE, let m
∗
−i be the message
profile for all players except i. In order to maximize its utility
ui, the platform i must select a price pi
i
i that minimizes the
fifth term in its tax ti. Specifically, at GNE,
pi∗ii = arg max
pii
i
∈R≥0
(piii − pi
∗l
i )
2 = pi∗li . (55)
Using the definitions of σil and τ
l
i in (51) and (50), the result
holds. Through a similar analysis, we can prove the result
when |Cl| = 2.
Finally, we note that the presence of the indicator function
I(·) does not lead to discontinuities in the utility ui of any
social media i ∈ I because the set Ci is determined a priori
and is independent of the message mi. Thus, with the help
of Lemma 5, we can easily see that all other Lemmas and
Theorems for the original mechanism hold for the extended
mechanism as well.
